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（内容の要旨） 
This dissertation consists of five essays on mechanism design and social indices. I 
study the problems of designing mechanisms and social indices that satisfy 
“desirable” properties. 
Consider a social planner who wishes to implement a social objective. In order 
for the planner to do this, he/she needs to gather information about individuals' 
preferences. However, even if the planner directly asks individuals about their 
preferences, they might not tell him the truth. This is because individuals may have 
incentives to misrepresent their preferences. Since a proposal based on the 
misrepresented preferences may fail, designing a mechanism that brings us to the 
social objective is important. In Chapters 1, 2, and 3, I deal with this problem. I 
particularly search for mechanisms that satisfy “desirable” properties such as 
efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. 
On the other hand, during the stage in which social objectives are decided, an 
accurate understanding of social conditions is indispensable. However, social 
conditions are usually determined by complex phenomena such as polarization. 
Using some quantitative indices is a helpful way to perceive such complex 
phenomena. However, if we use some “bad” indices, we may misperceive the 
complex phenomena, and also possibly misperceive social conditions, failing to plan 
appropriate social objectives. Therefore, designing "desirable" indices is important. 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I deal with this problem. I search for indices that satisfy 
“desirable” properties to measure the levels of human development and polarization 
in a society. 
In Chapter 1, I study famous Clarke's (1971) pivotal mechanisms. Moulin 
(1986) characterizes the pivotal mechanisms under the assumption of the full 
domain of quasi-linear preferences. In this chapter, I provide properties of restricted 
domains that are necessary and sufficient for Moulin's (1986) characterizations to 
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hold. I also provide simple economic conditions that imply these properties. 
In Chapter 2, I search for a mechanism that overcomes a drawback of the 
pivotal mechanisms: they do not satisfy individual rationality. I consider the 
problem of designing mechanisms that mediate disputes. A specific feature of the 
problem I examine is that each disputant may have a veto power to the outcomes of 
mechanisms. Given the specific feature, I impose individual rationality on 
mechanisms so that each disputant voluntarily accepts outcomes of mechanisms. 
First, I show that on the full domain of disputants' valuations, a mechanism that 
always forces disputants to continue the dispute uniquely satisfies a weaker version 
of efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and feasibility. Second, I 
show that on mildly restricted domains of disputants' valuations, there exist 
well-performed mechanisms that satisfy all four axioms and Pareto-dominates all 
mechanisms as such. 
In Chapter 3, I suggest how to find a boundary between the possibility and 
impossibility of implementing social choice rules. I introduce a new concept of 
implementation that uses the planner's ``guess" of individual preferences. Given a 
family of subsets of possible preference profiles, the planner guesses a subset to 
which individuals' true preference profile belongs. A social choice rule is said to be 
G-implementable if it is implemented in dominant strategies as long as the 
planner's guess is correct. I apply this implementability concept to public decision 
and auction problems. In a public decision problem, I characterize a class of social 
choice rules satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, feasibility, and 
G-implementability. In an auction problem with homogeneous goods, I characterize 
a class of auction rules that generate more revenue than any other auction rules 
satisfying efficiency, individual rationality, and G-implementability. I also show 
that rules in these two classes only require “minimal information” for the planner to 
guess correctly. 
In Chapter 4 (co-authored with Yoko Kawada and Shuhei Otani), we provide an 
axiomatic foundation of the Human Development Index (HDI). The aggregation 
formula of HDI was changed to geometric mean in 2010.  In this chapter, we 
search for a theoretical justification for employing this new HDI formula.  First, we 
find a maximal class of index functions, what we call quasi-geometric means, that 
satisfy symmetry for the characteristics, normalization, and separability. Second, 
we show that power means are the only quasi-geometric means satisfying 
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homogeneity. Finally, the new HDI is the only power mean satisfying two local 
complementability axioms, what we call minimal lower boundedness and sensitivity 
to lowest-level characteristics. 
In Chapter 5 (co-authored with Yoko Kawada and Keita Sunada), we consider a 
design problem of polarization measures. Esteban and Ray (1994) formalize an idea 
of polarization and develop a theory for its measurement. In their main theorem, 
they claim that a class of polarization measures, called the Esteban-Ray measures, 
is characterized by a set of axioms that capture an idea of polarization. However, we 
show that the claim does not hold by presenting a counterexample. We amend the 
main theorem by strengthening their Axiom 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
